Correctly estimating the confidence we should have in our decisions has traditionally been viewed as a perceptual judgement based solely on the strength or quality of sensory information. However, accumulating evidence has demonstrated that the motor system contributes to judgements of perceptual confidence. Here, we manipulated the speed at which participants' moved using a behavioural priming task and showed that increasing movement speed above participants' baseline measures disrupts their ability to form accurate confidence judgements about their performance. Specifically, after being primed to move faster than they would naturally, participants reported higher confidence in their incorrect decisions than when they moved at their natural pace. We refer to this finding as the adamantly wrong effect. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that veridical feedback from the effector used to indicate a decision is employed to form accurate metacognitive judgements of performance.
Introduction
Humans are unique amongst animals in being able to provide explicit reports on the reliability of, or confidence in their decisions. Previous studies have demonstrated that our confidence in our decisions or opinions plays a key role in group interactions (Bahrami et al., 2010; Koriat, 2012) . Whenever people express an opinion, they are likely to also communicate their confidence in that opinion, be this explicitly through what they say or implicitly in their movements and facial expressions (Aitchison, Bang, Bahrami, & Latham, 2015) . Accurate understanding of confidence has obvious implications for high-risk decision making domains such as financial investment (e.g. Broihanne, Merli, & Roger, 2014), medical diagnosis (e.g. Berner & Graber, 2008) , jury verdicts (e.g. Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007) , and politics (Johnson, 2004) .
Theoretical models of perception have proposed that confidence is related to the quality or strength of sensory processing (Barthelmé & Mamassian, 2010; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Vickers, 1979; Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2012; see Yeung & Summerfield, 2012 , for a review) and speak to a domain-specific formation of confidence judgements. However, there is increasing evidence that perceptual-decision signals are also seen in neural circuits specialised for motor actions (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Freedman & Assad, 2011; Hernández, Zainos, & Romo, 2002; Romo, Hernández, & Zainos, 2004; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001) , suggesting a contribution of the motor system to estimates of confidence, and supporting the idea of metacognition as a domain-general process. Indeed, it has recently been shown that disruption of the motor system, specifically the dorsal premotor cortex, reduces metacognitive ability when performing a perceptual discrimination task (Fleming et al., 2014) . In addition, Allen et al. (2016) report the results of an interoceptive priming manipulation where autonomic arousal modulates subjective confidence on a motion-discrimination task. Thus, it is has been suggested that movement parameters proprioceptive and interoceptive states may also serve as a useful cue for the inference of confidence in our own decision-making. 
